Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton

Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), was decided on the same day, and right after, the Miller case. This case further explains the Court's reasoning in creating the Miller standard, and was decided according to it.

A suit was brought to enjoin two Atlanta, Georgia Movie Theaters from showing allegedly obscene movies. The evidence at the trial court was limited to the movies themselves, which were pornographic, and simple pictures of the entrance of the theaters (which did not have any pictures, only a sign that said "Atlanta's Finest mature Feature Films"). There was no evidence that minors had entered the theaters. The trial judge dismissed the case, but the Georgia Supreme Court unanimously reversed because "the sale and delivery of obscene material to willing adults is not protected under the first amendment."

The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court's decision for reconsideration in light of Miller. First, the Court made clear that "obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment as a limitation of the state police power by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court also explained its opinion that obscene, pornographic films do NOT have constitutional immunity from state regulation if they are exhibited for consenting adults only and that the States have legitimate interest in "regulating the use of obscene material in local commerce and in all places of public accommodation, as long as these regulations do not run afoul of specific constitutional prohibitions."

In its reasoning, the Court also focused on the fact that the Theaters were in the public view, and had an effect on society. This, the Court articulated, is different from the showing/viewing of obscene materials in private. Although the state of Georgia could not produce and empirical data to suggest a connection between "antisocial behavior" and obscenity, the Court thought they could "quite reasonably determine that such a connection does or might exist." The Court also explained that there was no right to privacy interest in obscene material that was placed in commerce.